Biological safety cabinets are frequently relied upon to provide sterile work environments in which hazardous microorganisms can be safely handled. Verification of correct airstream velocities does not, by itself, ensure that adequate protection will be achieved under all users. Instead, the concentration of microorganisms in a cabinet operator's breathing zone must be measured during typical cabinet use conditions to determine whether the exposure is below acceptable limits. In this study, cabinet operator exposures were measured with a personal air sampler. Bacterial spores were released inside a cabinet as a uniform challenge aerosol, and the number of escaping spores was measured for several cabinet arrangements during a number of typical operations. The following were studied to determine their effects on aerosol containment: inflow air velocity, size of access opening, type of operator movements, location of operator's hands, and pace of activity. Other experiments examined differences in aerosol containment for eight typical microbiology operations when performed by six operators who covered a range of body heights and volumes.
Class II biological safety cabinets are used in bacteriology, mycology, and virology laboratories, and in pharmacies (i) to protect laboratory personnel from aerosolized material, especially biological hazards, and (ii) to protect work from contamination. In the United States, cabinets are evaluated according to National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) Standard No. 49 (5) , which covers requirements for design, construction, and performance. Australian (6) , British (2), German (3), and Japanese (4) standards describe similar requirements for cabinet construction and testing.
Laboratory pesonnel working at safety cabinets are protected by an inward flow of air through the work opening. High-efficiency particulate air-filtered exhaust and downflow air prevent contamination of the environment and materials inside a cabinet. Cabinets qualify for NSF certification after demonstrating that an aerosol of Bacillus subtilis spores sprayed toward the window from inside does not penetrate the air barrier (personnel protection). A cabinet must control an identical aerosol generated outside the unit so that it does not contaminate the work area (product protection) and show that sideways travel of aerosols over the work surface is kept to a minimum (cross-contamination). Once the velocity profile of the internal downflow air and the face velocity (average velocity of air entering the work opening) have been determined for a cabinet that meets all NSF No. 49 requirements and is certified by the NSF, production models qualify for Standard No. 49 certification if the measured air velocities fall within 10% of those of the NSF-tested cabinet.
The biological certification tests measure aerosol containment in unused cabinets operating at optimal airflows. They do not measure containment when an operator is conducting regular procedures that have a potential to disrupt airstreams, nor do they provide information on the effect of poor work practices. Therefore, a method is needed to measure operator exposure to microbiological aerosols originating inside cabinets during the A rotating slit-to-agar sampler (New Brunswick Scientific Co., Inc., New Brunswick, N.J.) was placed at the lower edge of the cabinet window sill, 20 cm from each side wall. The slit samplers each collected 25 liters per min. Turntables with 15-cm-diameter agar plates revolved beneath the sampling slots, completing 1 revolution per h. The slit sampler plates were divided into 60 1-min sectors, and the number of spores in the laboratory room air during each activity period was determined from the total number of bacillus colonies growing in the sectors of the two plates onto which air was impacted during that time.
Operators. A single cabinet operator was used in study 1 to control for differences between people and to assure repeatable operator movements. Three men (Fig. 2 , subjects A, B, and C) and three women (Fig. 2 , subjects D, E, and F) participated in study 2. Three were considered taller than average (A, B, and D), and three were shorter than average (C, E, and F). One subject in each group was heavier, i.e., wider and bulkier, than average (B and F). The women were familiar with the activities conducted in these simulations, whereas the men although familiar with chemistry bench work, were not microbiologists. During the tests, the volunteers wore laboratory coats that were buttoned for two of four tests, one each seated and standing, and worn open for the other two tests. The shorter subjects stood on blocks, as needed, to bring them to suitable working levels (Fig. 2) . The height of a laboratory stool was adjusted to accomodate each seated subject.
Activities. In study 1, the operator moved one or both hands either from the center of the cabinet work tray to a side wall or out through the work access opening and back inside. The activity was continuous for 2-min periods with a 1-min pause between activities to separate the samples collected on the slit sampler plates. Movements were paced with a metronome to assure reproducibility. Each activity was conducted slowly or quickly in the front or rear of the cabinet. The entire routine of motions was repeated at least three times for each combination of inflow air velocity and access opening height.
The activities of study 2 reproduced a number of routine culture manipulations. Three methods of mixing a culture in a test tube were compared, i.e., placing a tube on a Vortex mixer, inverting a screw-capped tube, and rolling a tube between two hands. The test tubes were filled with water by pipette before the mixing procedures and were emptied into a flask afterward. The rack of test tubes and the Vortex mixer were placed behind the front-rear center line of the work tray, 39 cm from the window and 25 cm from the rear wall. The operations of the second half of study 2 simulated processing of plate cultures. A set of petri dishes was repeatedly (i) inoculated by pipette with ca. 0.1 ml of water from a flask, (ii) touched with a bent glass rod to spread the inoculum over the agar surface, and (iii) streaked with a wire loop dipped into a flask. The procedures were first performed at a slow pace, while standing and while sitting, to familiarize the subjects with the carefully timed routines and were then performed at a pace twice as fast.
Protection factor. The British standard (2) sampler plates, these activities were subdiVided into five mixing and three plating operations (N = 6 operators x 4 tests per operator x 8 samples per test = 192). RESULTS Work opening height, examined in study 1, was a statistically significant predictor of the spore concentration at both sampling locations (Table 1) . Work opening height was negatively correlated with aerosol penetration of the air barrier, i.e., tracer concentration was higher outside the cabinet at either inflow velocity for a 20-cm-high window than it was for a 25-cm-high window. Inflow air velocity was significantly, and also negatively, correlated with room air concentration at the sides of the cabinet (Table 1) .
Aerosol concentration within the cabinet was a highly significant factor at the slit sampler location (P = 0.001). As would be expected, more spores were collected outside the cabinet when the concentration was higher inside. Room air temperature and relative humidity were not correlated with aerosol concentration.
Separate regressions were run on the slit sampler data for each type of motion, then for each location of hands, and finally for each speed (Table 2) . A larger number of spores was collected when hands were moved through the window than when they were moved sideways. After accounting for the effects of air velocity, window height, and type of movement, work location, i.e., close or far from the access opening, was marginally significant. More aerosol escaped when movements began in the rear of the cabinet. The difference between the two working speeds was not statistically significant, but a higher average concentration was seen during faster movements.
In these tests, the limit of detection, a single colony, was 0.0008 CFU per liter of air for the slit sampler, i.e., 1 Regression analysis revealed no significant differences between the eight activities of the second study (Table 3) . Whether the laboratory coat was unbuttoned and free to flap around or closed did not affect aerosol containment, nor did the pace of the activities. Operator sex was an important predictor of the number of spores collected at either sampler location. More spores escaped from the cabinet into an operator's breathing zone, but not out the sides of the cabinet, when the operators stood than when they were seated. The position of the impinger was higher relative to the access opening when the operators stood (Fig. 2) .
The samples collected in the breathing zone were positively correlated with operator height and weight (Fig. 3A) , except for subject F, the shortest, but third heaviest, person. Shorter and lighter, i.e., narrower, persons caused greater aerosol leakage at the sides of the cabinet, the slit sampler location (Fig. 3B) . DISCUSSION Our test of a safety cabinet's containment capabilities differed from NSF certification protocol by (i) the addition of an operator working at a cabinet, (ii) sampling in the operator's breathing zone with a personal sampler rather than with fixed area samplers, and (iii) introducing a test aerosol in such a manner that a uniform concentration of spores existed throughout the downflow cabinet air, not a heavy concentration delivered at high velocity in the center of the work area.
The results demonstrate that an inflow air velocity of 0.50 m/s contained the aerosol better than did an airflow of 0.38 m/s. A 25-cm-high work opening was more protective than a 20-cm-high opening. It is generally thought that a larger opening provides more opportunity for aerosol particles to escape, but in these tests, inflow air velocity was maintained constant when the window was raised. Given identical air velocities, a larger volume of air was drawn in through a wider opening, and the greater air flux provided better protection against loss of aerosol particles from the interior.
The operator's movements in study 1 caused more disruption of the air barrier and greater aerosol leakage was expected. Particles are extracted from a cabinet as contaminated air is withdrawn along with a person's arms and hands, and contamination can be shed from arms and equipment. It is therefore essential, for maximum personnel protection, that supplies be arranged to avoid reaching through a window during aerosol generating operations.
That working in the rear of a cabinet was less safe than working in the front was surprising and contrary to recommended practice. When cultures are handled behind the downflow air split of a cabinet, aerosol sprays are contained in the air exhausted from the rear (Fig. 1) . Contamination is not expected in the portion of air moving toward the front grille, in the direction of an operator. In this study, however, tracer spores were mixed with all cabinet air, even that in the front half. The presence of an operator's body closer to a window when reaching to the rear of a cabinet obstructed the inflow of air and created sufficient turbulence to cause cabinet air to spill out.
Significantly different levels of exposure were measured for the men and women, although whether this was due to a difference in level of skill and dexterity or to the positive correlation of maleness with height and weight cannot be clearly determined. Men, having more weight in the upper body half than women, are wider at the shoulders and present a broader obstacle at a work opening. The shorter subjects did not stand or sit considerably lower at the cabinet than did the taller ones, because their absolute heights were augmented to allow them to work comfortably at the access opening (Fig. 2) . To reach equipment in the rear half of the cabinet, however, the shorter subjects moved closer to the window and stretched further than did the taller ones. Nevertheless, shorter operators did not appear to be exposed to higher breathing zone aerosol concentrations because of this. Rather, the taller and, to some extent, the bulkier subjects caused escaping spores to remain at the center of the cabinet. Higher aerosol concentrations were collected at the sides of the cabinet for the thinner operators, and to some degree for the shorter operators, suggesting that leakage occurred peripherally when a narrow person worked close to the open window.
Identifying cabinet downflow air separations with smoke tubes and observing researchers working at biological safety cabinets revealed that few work comfortably behind the air split, because shorter persons cannot easily reach far into a cabinet, whereas taller ones hunch over to adjust eye level and arm position.
Subject F presented an interesting combination of predictor factors. All aerosol samples were very low (Fig. 3) , which was consistent with her sex or degree of skill, but confounded the trend for the correlation between breathing zone aerosol concentration and height and that between peripheral aerosol escape and weight.
It is reasonable to assume that the effectiveness of a cabinet is compromised when workers' movements are rapid, as opposed to slow and deliberate. This tendency was seen in our tests, but it was not statistically significant.
Although major advantages of using bacterial aerosols are the ability to detect very low concentrations of escaping organisms and the moderate cost compared with other tracer and detector systems, we realize that in-place biological tests cannot be undertaken in laboratories where the release of a bacterial aerosol would compromise clean work. Various other materials, e.g., salt and dye aerosols, and gases, have been used to measure containment. A potassium iodide aerosol is widely used in Great Britain, and a dioctyl phthalate aerosol is the challenge in the Australian cabinet test. Workers can also be monitored for exposure to agents handled in research laboratories or those encountered in clinical specimens, etc., when a personal sampler is used with culture media suitable for the organisms under investigation.
Conclusions. This study demonstrated that testing biological safety cabinets with persons working at them, conducting their usual culturing operations, provides different information on cabinet performance than does static testing. Further containment tests of this nature should be undertaken to evaluate other cabinet designs and laboratory procedures on a comparative basis and to measure the effects on aerosol containment of various combinations of activities, inflow and downflow air velocities, access opening heights, and cabinet widths. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that even well-operated biological safety cabinets lose a very small fraction of aerosolized particles. When absolute containment is required, a glove box must be used.
